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EXTENT OF EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION
SECTION 170
Since the adoption of the present Kentucky Constitution in 1891,
there has been a great deal of litigation in regard to the interpreta-
tion of the exemptions granted in section 170, and it is the purpose of
this paper to examine those decisions which relate to the exemptions
granted charitable institutions, and to determine the extent to which
they are exempt from taxation by this section.
The pertinent phrases of section 170 are as follows:
"There shall be exempt from taxation . . institutions of purely
public charity ... and all laws exempting or commuting property
from taxation other than the property above mentioned shall
be void."
In Lexington Cemetery Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission1 it was said: "The familiar rule is that an exemption
from taxation comes only through the graces of the sovereign, there-
fore it is given a strict interpretation, and any doubt as to the extent
of the exemption must be resolved against the taxpayer and in favor
of the State." Charitable institutions are granted tax 'exemption for
the reason that they render a service to the State and relieve it of a
burden which it would otherwise be the duty of the State and its
people to assume 2 A charitable institution whose services are not
dispensed within the Commonwealth of Kentucky cannot be granted
an exemption from taxation under the Kentucky Constitution, even
though it may be located in this State, or incorporated here, or own
property in Kentucky.2 As the charity renders no service within the
State, it can relieve the State of no burden which it would otherwise
be the duty of the State to assume. Thus there is no reason to grant
an exemption from taxation to such an institution. From the reason-
ing followed by the Court in these cases involving out-of-state chari-
ties, it would seem that a charitable institution incorporated outside
the State or even located elsewhere would be granted an exemption
from taxation on property which it owned in Kentucky if it rendered
any charitable services in this State.
Let us examine the cases to determine what is considered to be a
charity within the meaning of section 170 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion. Clearly those organizations are not included within the term
"purely public charity" which are provided for specifically and
'297 Ky. 851, 857, 181 S. W. 2d 699, 703 (1944).
'Lloyd Library and Museum v. Chipman, 232 Ky. 191, 22 S. W.
2d 597 (1929).
Layman Foundation v. City of Louisville, 232 Ky. 259, 22 S. W.
2d 622 (1929); Lloyd Library and Museum v. Chipman, 232 Ky. 191,
22 S. W. 2d 597 (1929).
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separately in other clauses of Section 170.' This would include
churches, cemeteries, public property, educational institutions, and
public libraries. The Court has consistently refused to include any
organization or activity within the term "purely public charity" if it
could possibly come within any of these other terms. Among the
things which the Court has decided are charities within the meaning
of section 170 are the Young Men's Christian Association,' a theologi-
cal seminary maintained by one religious denomination but open to
students of all denominations,' an orphan's home, and a preacher's
aid'society for the benefit of super-annuated ministers of a certain
denomination.' A hospital organized primarily for the purpose of
doing charitable work is an institution of purely public charity,"° but
when such charitable work is only incidental to the real purpose of
the hospital, such hospital cannot be exempt from taxation as a
"There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for
public purposes; places actually used for religious worship, with the
grounds attached thereto and used and appurtenant to the house of
worship, not exceeding one-half acre in cities or towns, and not ex-
ceeding two acres in the country; places of burial not held for private
or corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity, and institu-
tions of education not used or employed for gain by any person or
corporation, and the income of which is devoted solely to the cause
of education; public libraries, their endowments, and the income of
such property as is used exclusively for their maintenance; all par-
sonages or residences owned by any religious society, and occupied as
a home, and for no other purpose, by the minister of any religion,
with not exceeding one-half acre of ground in towns and cities and
two acres of ground in the country appurtenant thereto; household
goods and other personal property of a person with a family, not
exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars in value; crops grown in
the year in which the assessment is made, and in the hands of the
producer; and all laws exempting or commuting property from tax-
ation other than the property above mentioned shall be void. The
General Assembly may authorize any incorporated city or town to
exempt manufacturing establishments from municipal taxation, for
a period not exceeding five years, as an inducement to their location."
'Lexington Cemetery Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission, 297 Ky. 851, '181 S. W. 2d 699 (1944); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 119 Ky. 208, 83 S. W. 572 (1904) (a trust fund for the pro-
pagation of a religious sect); Commonwealth v. Lexington Cemetery
Co., 114 Ky. 165, 70 S. W. 280 (1902).
'Commonwealth v. Young Men's Christian Association, 116 Ky.
711, 76 S. W. 522 (1903).
City of Louisville v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
100 Ky. 506, 36 S. W. 955 (1896).
'Kentucky Female Orphan School v. City of Louisville, 100 Ky.
470, 36 S. W. 921 (1896).
'Preacher's Aid Society of Kentucky Annual Conference of
Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. Jacobs, 235 Ky. 790, 32 S. W.
2d 343 (1930).
" Mason County v. Hayswood Hospital of Maysville, 167 Ky. 17,
i79 S. W. 1050 (1915); City of Dayton v. Trustees of Speers Hospital,
165 Ky. 56, 176 S. W. 361 (1915).
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charity.' It is interesting to note that a trust fund, so long as it is
held in trust for a charitable purpose is exempt from taxation.' This
exemption applies even while the fund is held for a number of years,
pending litigation or to settle the estate, so long as the amount is
certain and the equitable owner, the charity, is determined with
certainty."
Generally it has been held that benevolent associations, such as
the Odd Fellows, the Elks or the Masons are not institutions of purely
public charity, but rather are private charities." The primary pur-
pose of such organizations is social and not charitable, and such do-
nations as they may make to help the indigent are only incidental;
the benefits paid to sick or indigent members are paid as a matter of
right and not as charity."G However, when a benevolent association
maintains a home for widows or orphans, such institutions are ex-
empt from taxation as institutions of purely public charity, even
though the recipients of such charitable benefits are restricted to
the children or widows of members of the lodge." The Court does not
consider that this factor alone causes the institution to lose its public
character, because there must be some means of determining who
shall be the recipients of any charity, and one classification is about
as logical as another. The main point is that the State is relieved of
the duty it would otherwise have to assume in regard to those indi-
gent persons cared for by the lodge. In one case the Court said that
the word "purely" was meant to describe the quality of the charity,
rather than the means by which it is administered.'
Having determined what is a charity within the meaning of
section 170, let us now examine the cases which have interpreted the
word "institution" within the meaning of this section. In Kentucky
Female Orphan School v. City of Louisville," the first case arising
' Gray Street Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1274,
65 S. W. 11 (1901).' Commonwealth v. Parr's Executor, 167 Ky. 46, 179 S. W. 1048
(1915); Commonwealth v. Pollitt, 76 S. W. 412 (Ky. 1903).
" Norton's Exrs. v. City of Louisville, 118 Ky. 836, 82 S. W. 621
(1904). See Moorman's Exr. v. Board of Supervisors, Jefferson
County, 192 Ky. 242, 232 S. W. 379 (1921).
"Benevolent Association of Elks v. Wintersmith, 204 Ky. 20, 263
S. W. 670 (1924); Merrick Lodge No. 31, I. 0. 0. F. v. City of Lex-
ington, 175 Ky. 275, 194 S. W. 92 (1917); Vogt v. City of Louisville,
173 Ky. 119, 190 S. W. 695 (1917); City of Newport v. Masonic Temple
Association, 108 Ky. 333, 56 S. W. 405 (1900).
' City of Newport v. Masonic Temple Assn., 108 Ky. 333, 56 S. W.
405 (1900).
'2Merrick Lodge No. 31, I. 0. 0. F. v. City of Lexington, 175 Ky.
275, 194 S. W. 92 (1917).
'Trustees of Widows' and Orphans' Fund of Beattyville Lodge
No. 304 I. 0. 0. F. v. Blount, 222 Ky. 717, 2 S. W. 2d 394 (1928);
Widows' and Orphans' Home of 0. F. v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 386,
103 S. W. 354 (1907).
'Widows' and Orphans' Home of 0. F. v. Commonwealth, 126
Ky. 386, 103 S. W. 354 (1907).100 Ky. 470, 36 S. W. 921 (1896).
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under section 170 of the Constitution of 1891, the Court gave a defi-
nition to the word "institution" which has been followed in all of the
later cases in regard to charities. In that case the city of Louisville
claimed the right to tax property located in Louisville which was
owned by an orphan school located in Midway, on the ground that
section 170 granted tax exemption only to the school buildings and
grounds, and not to other property which it might own elsewhere
and which was not used to house the work of the charity itself. The
Court decided that the orphan's school was a purely public charity,
and that its activities as well as its property were exempt from tax-
ation. In Corbin Y.M.C.A. v. Commonwealth the Court went on to
say:
"It will . . . be noticed that the very language employed
[in Section 1701 exempts 'property' used for public purposes,
religious worship or for cemeteries; but that it exempts not the
property but the institutions themselves which are engaged
purely in public charity or education... "
Following this reasoning, a restaurant operated in connection
with a Y.M.C.A.,2" property owned by a public charity and leased to
others for business purposes,-" and funds invested and the income
used in carrying on the work of the charity,' all have been held to
be exempt from taxation.
The meaning which the Court has placed on the word "institu-
tion" seems to be broad enough to include exemption from all kinds
of taxes. However, there are two instances in which the Court has
refused to exempt institutions of purely public charity. In the first
of these instances, the Court refused to exempt a charitable institu-
tion from the payment of an assessment for street improvements
made along property owned by the charity." The Court said that it
is a well settled principle that the sections of the Constitution relat-
ing to taxation do not apply to assessments.2 In the second instance,
the motor vehicle registration tax, a regulatory and not primarily a
revenue measure, was held to be not included in the exemption from
taxation granted to charities under section 170. In each of these
two exceptional instances the levy in question was not a tax in the
strict sense of the word, so it may be said that these are not ex-
181 Ky. 384, 386, 205 S. W. 388, 388 (1918).
Id.
City of Louisville v. Presbyterian Orphan Home 'Soc. of Louis-
ville, 299 Ky. 566, 186 S. W. 2d 194 (1945); Trustees of Widows' and
Orphans' Fund of Beattyville Lodge No. 304, I. 0. 0. F. v. Blount,
222 Ky. 717, 2 S. W. 2d 394 (1928); City of Louisville v. Y. M. C. A.,
166 Ky. 104, 178 S. W. 1168 (1915); Commonwealth v. Young Men's
Christian Association, 116 Ky. 711, 76 S. W. 522 (1903).
'Widows' and Orphans' Home of 0. F. v. Commonwealth, 126
Ky. 386, 103 S. W. 354 (1907).
'Hager, Auditor v. Gast, 119 Ky. 502, 84 S. W. 556 (1905).
" Id. at 506.
'Gray v. Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Widows and Or-
phans Home in State of Kentucky, 272 Ky. 646, 114 S. W. 2d 1141
(1938).
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ceptions to the rule of complete exemption from taxation, but rather
limitations on the meaning of the word "taxation." In all other
instances the property of the charity, however used, and its activi-
ties which are consistent with its purpose and objects have been
completely exempt from state and local taxation.
In many of the cases involving taxation of income-producing
property owned by institutions of purely public charity, there have
been very vehement dissenting opinions. The arguments made there
express the fear that in time charities will come to own so much
property, especially in the business sections of the cities, that to con-
tinue to exempt such property from taxation would be a tremendous
burden on the State, and especially on the cities. It may be said
that it will be a distinct evil to continue to grant exemption from
taxation for such property, if in the course of time this state of af-
fairs does come to pass. But it seems rather absurd to think that
charities now own such property to the extent that such ownership
is a menace to society. If it should become a menace and should
ever reach such proportions as to overbalance the service rendered
to the State by such institutions of purely public charity, then the
remedy would be in an amendment to the Constitution of Kentucky.
MARY GARNER BORDEN
